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Previous research has shown that inconsistencies across repeated interviews do not
indicate deception because liars deliberately tend to repeat the same story. However,
when a strategic interview approach that makes it difficult for liars to use the repeat
strategy is used, both consistency and evasive answers differ significantly between truth
tellers and liars, and statistical software (binary logistic regression analyses) can reach
high classification rates (Masip et al., 2016b). Yet, if the interview procedure is to be
used in applied settings the decision process will be made by humans, not statistical
software. To address this issue, in the current study, 475 college students (Experiment 1)
and 142 police officers (Experiment 2) were instructed to code and use consistency,
evasive answers, or a combination or both before judging the veracity of Masip et al.’s
(2016b) interview transcripts. Accuracy rates were high (60% to over 90%). Evasive
answers yielded higher rates than consistency, and the combination of both these
cues produced the highest accuracy rates in identifying both truthful and deceptive
statements. Uninstructed participants performed fairly well (around 75% accuracy),
apparently because they spontaneously used consistency and evasive answers. The
pattern of results was the same among students, all officers, and veteran officers only, and
shows that inconsistencies between interviews and evasive answers reveal deception
when a strategic interview approach that hinders the repeat strategy is used.
Keywords: deception, lie detection, consistency, interviewing, police, deception cues, cognitive load, evasive
answers
INTRODUCTION
Between-Statement Inconsistencies and Deception
Humans are poor lie detectors. According to a comprehensive meta-analysis, humans’ accuracy in
discriminating between truths and lies on the basis of the sender’s behavior is 54%, which is just
above 50% chance accuracy (Bond and DePaulo, 2006). Discrimination accuracy is poor because
(a) communication senders hardly display any behavioral cue to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003;
Sporer and Schwandt, 2006, 2007; Hauch et al., 2015); (b) the diagnostic value of deception cues
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depends on a number of moderator variables (DePaulo et al.,
2003; Sporer and Schwandt, 2006, 2007; Hauch et al., 2015);
and (c) even the most reliable cues are poorly related to truth
or deception (Hartwig and Bond, 2011). These findings suggest
that training programs to detect deception on the basis of
(fallible) behavioral cues can have only limited success (see Hauch
et al., 2016). As suggested by Hartwig and Bond (2011), a more
effective approach involves designing interview strategies that
elicit or maximize behavioral differences between liars and truth
tellers.
Over the last decade, a number of such interview strategies
have been developed by behavioral scientists (Vrij et al., 2010;
Vrij and Granhag, 2012; for an overview of recent trends
in deception research, see Masip, 2017). A promising and
forensically relevant approach attempts to elicit between-
statement inconsistencies—that is, inconsistencies among
separate accounts of the same person (see Vredeveldt et al.,
2014). Leins et al. (2011) asked truth tellers and liars to provide
verbal and pictorial (drawing a map) descriptions of their
whereabouts. The consistency between the verbal statements
and the drawings was higher among truth tellers than among
liars. Subsequent research showed that the key factor to eliciting
inconsistencies in liars was switching the interview mode (from
verbal to pictorial or vice-versa; Leins et al., 2012).
Other authors have examined inconsistencies without
changing interview format, but manipulating question type
instead. Mac Giolla and Granhag (2015), and Granhag et al.
(2016) interviewed liars and truth tellers three times using
both anticipated questions (i.e., questions that interviewees
can reasonably expect to be asked during the interview) and
unanticipated questions (i.e., questions that are hardly expected
by the interviewees). No difference in consistency was predicted
between liars and truth tellers in replying to anticipated
questions, but the authors expected liars to be more inconsistent
than truth tellers in replying to unanticipated questions.
However, the findings did not support their prediction: Liars and
truth tellers displayed similar levels of consistency irrespective of
question type1.
There are at least two possible explanations for the null
findings under the unanticipated questions condition. First, the
“unanticipated” questions were the same across all interviews;
therefore, in reality they were unanticipated only during the first
interview. Second, in the studies byGranhag et al. (2016) andMac
Giolla and Granhag (2015), the three interviews “were conducted
in direct succession with a minimal waiting period between
1In the study by Granhag et al. (2016), liars and truth tellers planned some
actions to be performed either in a shopping mall or in a train station. They were
subsequently interviewed three times with both unanticipated and anticipated
questions. The authors used a more fine-grained measure of consistency than Mac
Giolla and Granhag (2015); namely, they calculated the proportion of repetitions,
omissions, and commissions across interviews. The only significant difference
between truth tellers and liars was a difference in commissions (but not in
repetitions or omissions) when answering to unanticipated questions in the train
station situation (but not in the shopping mall situation). The general conclusion
of the authors was that “truth tellers and liars were extremely similar with regards
to between-statement consistency. This trend held across all eight situations where
between-statement consistency could be measured, and with all three forms of
consistency measures (omissions, commissions, and repetitions)” (p. 10).
each interview” (Mac Giolla and Granhag, 2015, p. 145). For
inconsistencies to be elicited in liars it is important to increase the
retention interval between the interviews: Over time, thememory
trace of poorly encoded information, such as imagined rather
than perceptually experienced details, or peripheral rather than
central details, might become weaker (e.g., Craik and Tulving,
1975). This memory decay can result in omissions during the
second or third interview, as well as in contradictions across
repeated interviews2.
However, other research using long intervals between
interviews has also found liars to be about as consistent
as truth tellers (Granhag and Strömwall, 2002; Granhag
et al., 2003; Strömwall and Granhag, 2005). To explain this
evidence, Granhag and Strömwall (1999) proposed the repeat
vs. reconstruct hypothesis. In a deliberate attempt to appear
consistent—and hence credible—liars presumably make an effort
to repeat the same invented story every time they are interviewed.
Conversely, truth tellers simply describe what they recall about
the target event. Because memory is reconstructive and error
prone (Tulving, 2000; Loftus, 2003), the truth tellers’ successive
recollections might contain some discrepancies. As a result, the
net amount of (in)consistencies displayed by liars and truth
tellers is very similar (Granhag and Strömwall, 1999).
There are, however, a number of features in Granhag
and Strömwall’s studies that might have facilitated the liars’
usage of the repeat strategy (see Fisher et al., 2013). First,
the participants were aware that they would be interviewed
repeatedly. Therefore, theymight have rehearsed their statements
after the first interview. Research shows that rehearsal can
attenuate memory decay (see Dark and Loftus, 1976; Agarwal
et al., 2013). Second, all questions were about central aspects
of the event; hence, they could have been anticipated by liars
(Fisher et al., 2013). Third, the first interview was conducted
immediately after the event, the second interview 4 days later, and
the final interview 1 week after the second one. The immediate
interview and the participants’ knowledge that more interviews
would be conducted may have inoculated the liars’ memory
against forgetting. This might have made the liars’ memory trace
strong even after a 4-day delay, and continued recall attempts
of the false stories (especially its core aspects) might have
additionally attenuated memory decay (Ebbesen and Rienick,
1998). Fourth, there were no manipulations to make it difficult
for liars to invent deceptive responses during the first interview,
to experience difficulty encoding their initial responses, or to
create demand on retrieval attempts during the subsequent
interviews.
A way to hinder fabrication, encoding, and retrieval is by
increasing cognitive load. Vrij et al. (2010) listed a number of
reasons why during an interview lying is more cognitively taxing
than telling the truth. Also, basic cognitive research has shown
that lying requires greater access to executive control processes
than truth telling (e.g., Debey et al., 2012), and neuroimaging
2Surprisingly, it has not been until recently that the influence of delay, strength of
encoding, and detail salience on truth tellers’ and liars’ memory has begun to be
examined empirically. For recent research on these topics, see Roos af Hjelmsäter
et al. (2014), Harvey et al. (2017a,b), and Sakrisvold et al. (2017).
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research has revealed that brain areas involved in working
memory, response monitoring, response conflict, inhibition, and
multitasking are activated to a greater extent during deception
than truth telling (Farah et al., 2014; Gamer, 2014; Lisofsky et al.,
2014). In short, lying often involves greater cognitive demands
than does telling the truth3. If the interviewees’ cognitive load
is artificially increased during the interview, the liars will have
fewer resources left compared to truth tellers, and will be less
able to effectively cope with the increased cognitive demands. As
a result, liars might display more observable signs of cognitive
overload (e.g., response latencies, pauses, and a decrease in body
movements) than truth tellers.
Supporting these considerations, recent research shows that
artificially inducing cognitive load during an interview results in
an increase in visible deception cues (Vrij et al., 2016), as well as
in observers’ ability to more accurately judge veracity (Vrij et al.,
2017).
Inducing cognitive load during repeated interviews might
generate between-statement inconsistencies in liars. Inventing
a deceptive response to an unexpected question on the spot is
cognitively demanding; therefore, increasing the liars’ cognitive
load further during the interview might hinder encoding (e.g.,
Chandler and Sweller, 1996). Likewise, an increased cognitive
load during a subsequent interview might hinder retrieval of
poorly encoded responses provided during the first interview
(e.g., Craik et al., 1996). These processes can yield inconsistencies
between interviews.
Interviewing Strategically to Elicit
Between-Statement Inconsistencies and
Evasive Answers
Based on the above considerations, Masip et al. (2016b) designed
a strategic interview approach to detect false alibies. Guilty
participants (n = 24) committed a mock crime, while innocent
participants (n = 24) performed four tasks under the guidance
of an experimenter. Both guilty and innocent participants were
subsequently informed that they were suspects of the crime and
would be interviewed. Their task was to convince the interviewer
that they were innocent and had performed the innocent
participants’ activities. To prepare their alibi, guilty participants
were given the opportunity to “search for information” by
requesting from the experimenter all details about the innocent
tasks that they deemed necessary to convince the interviewer of
their innocence.
The interview was conducted immediately, and was repeated
unexpectedly after a 1-week retention interval. It focused on
the alibi (i.e., the activities of the innocent participants), and
contained eight central questions (questions about the actions
performed by the innocent participants and about the core
details; these details cannot be changed without changing the
story), and eight peripheral questions (questions about details and
actions that were secondary to the event; these were aspects that
could be altered with the central storyline remaining unchanged).
3Of course, there are certain circumstances where lying does not involve more
cognitive load than truth telling (see Burgoon, 2015; Sporer, 2016; Blandón-Gitlin
et al., 2017).
An example of a central question is “What was the first task?”; an
example of a peripheral question is “How many chairs were in
the office room?” (see Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material for
the full set of relevant questions; Questions 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15,
and 16 were central, while Questions 3, 5, 8, 11, 12, 14, 17, and 18
were peripheral). All questions were about specific details, thus
requiring short answers; this would facilitate the measurement
and coding of the dependent variables.
The interviewees’ cognitive load was increased during the
interview by asking them to reply to all questions and to do so as
soon as possible after each question. Specifically, the interviewees
were told that delayed responses could indicate deception,
and the interviewer held a chronometer through the entire
interview. Asking to reply quickly is cognitively demanding
because retrieving information from long term memory requires
time, particularly if the memory is poorly encoded—as was
probably the case among the liars in Masip et al.’s (2016b) study,
who did not perform the innocent tasks but merely learned
about them from the experimenter. Further, a guilty suspect
who ignores or cannot retrieve the relevant information needs
to fabricate a plausible answer on the spot to avoid detection;
this task can be very demanding (see Vrij et al., 2010; Walczyk
et al., 2014), requiring time and concentration. Because of these
reasons, the need to reply quickly might be extremely taxing for
liars.
Note that Masip et al. (2016b) took measures to hinder the
liars’ “repeat strategy”: The participants were unaware that they
would be interviewed again, the time between the first and the
second interview was relatively long, peripheral questions were
asked in addition to central questions, and cognitive load was
induced. The authors found that, as predicted, guilty suspects
requested central rather than peripheral information from the
experimenter to prepare their alibi. This finding suggested that
liars would have more information about the central aspects
of the innocents’ tasks than about the peripheral aspects. The
main dependent measures were response accuracy, consistency
across interviews, and evasive answers. If the suspect gave the
same answer to the same question in both interviews, that was
coded as a consistent response. If the suspect gave semantically
different answers, that was coded as an inconsistent response.
Evasive answers were replies that contained no information, such
as saying “I don’t remember,” or replying “there was no poster”
when asked on which wall there was a poster. The rationale
behind measuring evasive answers was that guilty participants
urged to reply quickly can resort to answers of this kind whenever
they can neither retrieve the correct answer nor invent a plausible
one.
Masip et al. (2016b; see also Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2017)
predicted that, relative to truth tellers, liars would score lower
on response accuracy and consistency, and higher on evasive
answers. These hypotheses were supported by the data. The
authors also predicted that the differences between liars and
truth tellers in terms of the three dependent measures would
be larger in responding to peripheral than to central questions.
However, for response accuracy the difference was of the same
magnitude regardless of centrality, for consistency it was larger
for responses to central questions than for responses to peripheral
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questions4, and for evasive answers it was larger for responses
to peripheral than to central questions, as expected—though,
importantly, the difference in evasive answers between liars and
truth tellers was significant for both responses to peripheral
questions and responses to central questions (for more detail
about the predictions and the interpretation of the results, see
Masip et al., 2016b).
Note that consistency was found to be an indicator of
truthfulness, while evasive answers were found to signal
deception. However, whenever a participant gave the same
evasive answer (e.g., “I don’t remember”) in response to the same
question in both interviews, that was coded as a consistent reply
(= a truth indicator), even though evasive answers were found to
indicate deception, not truthfulness. To address this issue, Masip
et al. (2016b) created a new variable that combined consistency
and evasive answers. Specifically, inconsistencies were coded as
0, consistencies due to a repeated evasive answer were also coded
as 0, and all other consistencies were coded as 1. In this way,
0 always denoted deception and 1 always denoted truthfulness.
As expected, scores on this variable were significantly higher for
innocent than for guilty suspects. The Guilt Status × Question
Type (central vs. peripheral) interaction was not significant,
indicating that the difference between innocent and guilty
participants was similar irrespective of question centrality.
Masip et al. (2016b) conducted binary logistic regression
analyses (BLRAs) with the leave-one-out cross validationmethod
to see how well truthful and deceptive interviews could be
detected on the basis of inconsistencies and evasive answers.
Classification rates were 69% on the basis of consistency (71%
for truths and 67% for lies), 73% on the basis of consistency for
central questions (87% for truths and 58% for lies), 87% (for
both truths and lies) on the basis of evasive answers, and 94%
on the basis of the combined consistency and evasive answers
variable (96% for truths and 92% for lies). The interviewers in
Masip et al.’s (2016b) study also judged veracity. There were 22
interviewers who questioned an average of 4.36 suspects each
(conducting either the first or the second interview, but not both,
for each of the suspects they questioned). Each interviewer made
a dichotomous veracity judgment in a form immediately after
questioning each suspect. The interviewers’ mean accuracy rate
was 54% (71% for truths and 40% for lies). Clearly, the BLRAs
classification rates compare well to the interviewers’ accuracy
rates.
Current Study
Masip et al.’s (2016b) BLRAs classification rates were fairly high,
but they were derived from statistical analyses performed by a
computer program. If the interview procedure is ever to be used
4Masip et al. (2016b) explained this unexpected finding in terms of the forced
confabulation effect: When people generate answers to unanswerable questions,
they might incorporate the confabulated responses in their memory network and
provide the same answer during subsequent interviews (Pezdek et al., 2007).
It is also possible that guilty participants being asked a peripheral question to
which they ignored the answer experienced the situation as unexpected, salient,
and thrilling, which might have facilitated memory encoding of the circumstance
(including the response given) during the first interview, as well as memory
retrieval during the second interview (see Bradley et al., 1992).
in real life, the decision process will be made by humans, not
computers. Therefore, it is critical to examine whether human
beings instructed to use the diagnostic cues identified by Masip
et al. (2016b) perform well enough in classifying the interviews
as truthful or deceptive. In particular, we were interested in
knowing whether humans would be able to reach accuracy rates
comparable to the classification rates of the BLRAs conducted by
Masip et al. (2016b).
The purpose of the current study was to address this issue.
Human participants read the transcripts of Masip et al.’s (2016b)
interviews (each individual participant read only a subset of
the interviews) and indicated whether each suspect lied or told
the truth. Recall that in the study by Masip et al. (2016b),
consistency across peripheral and central questions, consistency
in responding to central questions, evasive answers, and the
combination (in the specific way explained above) of consistency
and evasive answers significantly discriminated between guilty
suspects (liars) and innocent suspects (truth tellers). These cues
also resulted in high BLRAs classification rates. Therefore, we
instructed four groups of participants to judge the veracity of
suspects by using either consistency (consistency condition),
consistency in answering to central questions (consistency-
central condition), evasive answers5 (evasive-A condition), or the
combined consistency and evasive answers variable (consistency-
evasive condition). We also included two control groups in the
design: A no-instruction group (uninstructed condition) whose
performance was expected to be close to chance accuracy, and a
so-called “information group” (information condition) who was
informed about the correct answers to all interview questions and
thus was expected to perform close to perfection. In Experiment
1, college students acted as participants. In an attempt to increase
ecological validity, we ran Experiment 2 with law enforcement
officers as participants. For both experiments, we predicted
that instructed participants would be fairly able to discriminate
between truthful and deceptive statements, performing better




The participants were 475 psychology students (386 females and
89 males; M age = 19 years; SD = 2.82). They participated on a
voluntary basis but were incentivized with an academic reward (a
slight increase in the course grade).
Materials
All participants received a set of interview transcripts and
a response sheet, along with detailed written instructions.
5Although in the study by Masip et al. (2016b) the difference between guilty and
innocent suspects in terms of evasive answers was larger in replying to peripheral
than to central questions, the difference was significant in replying to both kinds
of questions. In addition, the overall effect size for the difference between guilty
and innocent suspects across both question types was very large (d = 2.11).
Therefore, we decided to include in the current study a group instructed to focus on
evasive answers overall rather than on evasive answers in responding to peripheral
questions only.
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Following the instructions, the participants in the experimental
conditions had to mark each consistent reply, evasive answer, etc.
on the transcript pages. They also had to calculate the percentages
(of consistent replies, evasive answers, etc.) for each suspect,
write the figures on the response sheet, and make a dichotomous
true/lie decision for each suspect. A more detailed description of
the materials and procedures follows.
Interview transcripts
Masip et al. (2016b) collected data from 24 truth tellers and
24 liars. All 48 participants were interviewed twice. Therefore,
we had 48 pairs of interviews—one pair from each suspect. In
order to avoid tiredness and boredom among raters, as well as
to allow them to do the rating task within a reasonable time,
we limited the number of interview pairs (or suspects) to be
rated by each participant to 12. Therefore, we divided the 48
interview pairs in four sets. Each set contained six truthful
and six deceptive pairs. We ensured that the suspects’ gender
and age did not differ significantly across truths and lies and
interview sets.We additionally created two versions of each set by
counter-balancing the presentation order of the interview pairs.
Specifically, the order of the “direct” (D) version of the set was
determined randomly, and then it was reversed for the “reverse”
(R) version of the set, such that interview pair (or suspect)
number 1 in the D version was number 12 in the R version, pair
number 2 in the D version was number 11 in the R version, and
so forth.
The transcripts of the interview pairs were printed and
arranged in 12-page booklets, each page containing one interview
pair. There were separate booklets for Set 1-D (direct), Set 1-
R (reverse), Set 2-D, Set 2-R, Set 3-D, Set 3-R, Set 4-D, and
Set 4-R. As shown in Appendix 1 (Supplementary Material)
(transcript page for the consistency condition corresponding to
Suspect 7 in Set 3-D), each page in each booklet contained the
set number (1 through 4) and order (D or R), the participant
(i.e., suspect) number (1 through 12), a column with all interview
questions, a column with the suspect’s answers to each question
during the first interview, and another column with the suspect’s
answers to each question during the second interview. Except for
the uninstructed control group, whose participants had to read
the transcripts and make their veracity judgments intuitively,
additional columns were added such that the raters could
calculate the percentage of consistencies (consistency condition),
evasive answers (evasive-A condition), etc. for each suspect. For
example, as shown in Appendix 1 (Supplementary Material), for
the consistency condition, two additional columns were added.
For those questions to which the suspect had given the same
answer in the two interviews, the raters had to write “1” in the
“Same answer? YES” column. For those questions to which the
suspect had given a different answer in each interview, the raters
had to write “1” in the “Same answer? NO” column. Then, to
calculate the percentage of consistent answers out of 16, the raters
had to sum the numbers of the “Same answer? YES” column and
multiply the result times 6.256. Finally, they had to write the result
6By multiplying the sum times 6.25 the result was transformed from a 0-to-16
scale to a 0-to-100 scale; in other words, the percentage of consistent answers was
in the final cell on the page. Similar operations had to be done by
the other experimental groups.
Response sheet
The response sheet was used to collect the raters’ demographic
information (age and gender) as well as their veracity judgments.
Specifically, the raters had to compare the final percentage they
had calculated for each suspect (see previous paragraph) with
a specific cutoff score taken from the BLRAs of Masip et al.’s
(2016b) study to determine whether each individual suspect was
truthful or deceptive7. They had to express their judgments on
the response sheet.
The uninstructed participants had to make their judgments
using their own intuitive criteria; therefore, their response sheet
was slightly different in that they had to briefly report in writing
the reasons for their truth and lie judgments.
Correct answers sheet
The information condition participants had to code whether each
answer given to each question in each interview was correct or
not. To do this task, they received a sheet with all 16 critical
questions and the correct answer to each question.
Instructions
Detailed instructions were written for each group. The
instructions contained some basic information about the setup
of Masip et al.’s (2016b) study, as well as detailed guidelines on
how to proceed to complete the final columns on the transcript
pages, how to make all of the calculations, and how to fill in
the final response sheet. For all the instructed conditions, the
need to closely follow the instructions and not to make intuitive
judgments or use cues other than the ones described in these
instructions was emphasized8.
Procedure
The sessions were run during a regular Social Psychology lecture.
Each class was assigned to a different condition (the allocation of
students to a specific class is made by the School administration
on the basis of the first letter of the students’ surnames). The
number of participants in each condition is displayed in the first
row in Table 1. To avoid social interactions during the sessions,
all students were sat leaving an empty seat on each side. The
students were informed that participation was voluntary, and
that they could withdraw at any time. After signing a consent
form, they received the written instructions, the booklets with the
transcripts9, and the response sheets. The information condition
participants also received the correct answers sheet.
obtained. The calculation is based on a simple mathematical “rule of three”: If 16
⇒ 100% and Sum⇒ X, then X = Sum× (100/16)= Sum× 6.25.
7For example, the BLRA cut-off point for the consistency and evasive answers
combined variable was 73% (Masip et al., 2016b). Thus, in the current study we
instructed participants in the consistency-evasive condition to judge those suspects
for whom the final percentage was lower than 73% as deceptive, and those for
whom the final percentage was 73% or higher as truthful.
8The instructions, the correct answer sheet, and the response sheets are available
(in Spanish) from the first author on request.
9For each group, the eight different versions of the transcript booklets [4 Sets × 2
Interview Orderings (direct and reverse)] were interspersed; thus, the number of
participants receiving each version was about the same.
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TABLE 1 | Sample size, mean accuracy rates, and standard deviations for the separate conditions in Experiment 1.
Measure Consistency Consistency-central Uninstructed Evasive-A Consistency-evasive Information
n 79 74 81 77 76 88
M 64.51a 73.65b 75.93b 86.97c 87.83c 98.77d
SD 9.66 10.60 15.48 5.29 11.66 2.97
The conditions are sorted according to mean accuracy rates. Scheffé tests were conducted for pairwise comparisons; within each row, means with different superscripts differ significantly
from each other.
One experimenter carefully read aloud and clarified the
instructions. Next, the participants worked on the task on
their own. After all participants had finished, the experimenters
collected all materials and debriefed the participants.
Coding
Uninstructed participants (n = 81) indicated the reasons behind
their veracity judgments. In all, they provided 193 reasons for
their truth judgments, and 254 reasons for their lie judgments.
A researcher went over all responses and, using a data-driven
(bottom-up) approach, created a coding scheme with a number
of individual cues arranged in cue categories (Table 2). He also
wrote a five-page booklet with the descriptions of all cues. Two
research assistants blind to the hypotheses read the booklet
and independently coded all individual responses. Reliability
(Cohen’s Kappa) is displayed in Table 2. Inter-rater discrepancies
were resolved by discussion.
Results
Examination of the transcript pages and response sheets revealed
that some participants had inadvertedly committed some errors
(such as leaving a row blank in a transcript page, making
calculation errors in summing or multiplying numbers in the
transcript pages, etc.). These errors were corrected and the
analyses were run both on the uncorrected and on the corrected
data. Because in real life coders can also make the same kind of
errors made by our participants, and because we did not want
to manipulate the participants’ responses, the results reported in
the current paper were obtained with the uncorrected data set. If,
as suggested by a reviewer, in real life practitioners presumably
commit fewer errors than research participants because they
are more careful and double-check the numbers, then the
current results represent conservative estimates of the potential
of the proposed interview approach and raters’ instruction.
However, for the sake of transparency, all of the analyses and
descriptive statistics provided here for the uncorrected data are
also provided in Appendix 2 (Supplementary Material) with
the corrected data. Comparison of both sets of results reveals
that they are virtually identical. Indeed, because the errors only
changed the percentages slightly, they had a minimal impact
on the final veracity judgments. This paragraph also applies to
Experiment 2.
Accuracy
A mixed 2 (Veracity) x 6 (Condition: Consistency, Consistency-
Central, Evasive-A, Consistency-Evasive, Control, and
Information) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the veracity
factor, was conducted on accuracy (percentage of correct
lie/truth judgments). The veracity main effect was significant,
F(1, 469) = 4.70, p = 0.031, η
2
p = 0.010, indicating that truths
(M = 82.68, SD = 19.55) were slightly better identified than
lies (M = 80.52, SD = 19.28). The condition main effect was
also significant, F(5, 469) = 120.74, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.563.
Descriptive data are displayed in Table 1. The lowest accuracy
rate corresponded to the consistency condition, M = 64.51,
SD = 9.66, though it was nevertheless rather substantial—note
that chance accuracy was 50%. Unexpectedly, the uninstructed
group performed at the same level as the consistency-central
group, judging correctly as liars or truth tellers roughly three
out of every four suspects. Finally, the two groups using evasive
answers (Evasive-A and Consistency-Evasive) performed at the
same level, close to 90% accuracy (Table 1).
The Veracity x Condition interaction was also significant,
F(5, 469) = 9.10, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.088. As shown in
Figure 1, accuracy for truths increased more abruptly across
the conditions than accuracy for lies (which did not vary
significantly across the consistency, consistency-central, and
uninstructed conditions), though the two lines ultimately
converge. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed
that whereas there were significant differences between the
identification of truths and lies in the consistency (p = 0.001),
consistency-central (p < 0.001), and uninstructed (p = 0.017)
conditions, the difference was not significant for the evasive-A
(p = 0.192), consistency-evasive (p = 0.681), and information
(p= 0.819) conditions. Thus, not only were the two groups using
evasive answers more accurate overall than the uninstructed
group and the two consistency groups, but also less biased toward
making truth or lie judgments.
Cues Used by the Uninstructed Raters
Examination of the reasons given by uninstructed control
participants for their judgments (Table 2) can help clarify why
their accuracy was so high. Here we focus on the cue categories
mentioned by at least 25% of respondents. These cue categories
were consistency/inconsistency across interviews (mentioned by
90% of respondents; see third column in Table 2), confidence
vs. doubts and lack of confidence (64%), details or knowledge
(58%), clarity and concision (35%) and attitude (26%). It is
apparent from the fourth and fifth columns in Table 2 that
59.26% of uninstructed respondents mentioned consistency
across interviews as a reason for their truth judgments, whereas
only 12.35% of them mentioned this cue as a reason for their
lie judgments. The difference was significant (see final column in
Table 2).
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TABLE 2 | Reasons provided by the uninstructed participants in Experiment 1 to explain their truth and lie judgments.






CONSISTENCY/INCONSISTENCY ACROSS INTERVIEWS 0.93 90.12 76.54 82.72 0.332
Consistency across interviews 0.96 66.67 59.26 12.35 <0.001
Inconsistency across interviews 0.89 51.85 0.00 51.85 <0.001
Better recall during Interview 1 0.96 20.99 20.99 0.00 <0.001
Better recall during Interview 2 0.98 30.86 2.47 28.40 <0.001
Unspecific 0.65 4.94 4.94 2.47 0.500
CONFIDENCE/DOUBTS AND LACK OF CONFIDENCE 0.96 64.20 35.80 48.15 0.134
Confidence or certainty 0.87 29.63 24.69 8.64 0.007
Doubts or lack of confidence 0.87 51.85 11.11 41.98 <0.001
Unspecific 0.32 2.47 2.47 1.23 1.000
DETAILS OR KNOWLEDGE 0.89 58.02 30.86 53.09 0.001
Detailed or precise answers 0.88 30.86 19.75 11.11 0.230
Vague or unspecific answers 0.83 23.46 4.94 18.52 0.019
Ignoring the answers 0.92 34.57 3.70 30.86 <0.001
Unspecific 0.91 6.17 2.47 3.70 1.000
CLARITY AND CONCISION 0.85 34.57 24.69 20.99 0.648
Clear and/or concise answers 0.95 27.16 19.75 8.64 0.078
Ambiguous or unclear reply, verbiage… 0.72 17.28 3.70 13.58 0.057
Unspecific 0.39 2.47 2.47 0.00 0.500
ATTITUDE 0.88 25.93 16.05 16.05 1.000
Spontaneity 0.89 13.58 13.58 0.00 0.001
Nervousness or lack of spontaneity 0.83 14.81 0.00 14.81 <0.001
Unspecific 0.80 2.47 2.47 1.23 1.000
UNDEFINED CONSISTENCY/INCONSISTENCY 0.78 17.28 7.41 13.58 0.227
Undefined consistency 0.69 7.41 6.17 2.47 0.375
Undefined inconsistency 0.75 13.58 3.70 11.11 0.109
CONSISTENCY/INCONSISTENCY AMONG INTERVIEWEES 0.87 14.81 9.88 9.88 1.000
Consistency among interviewees 0.76 8.64 4.94 3.70 1.000
Inconsistency among interviewees 0.91 6.17 1.23 4.94 0.375
Unspecific – 3.70 3.70 1.23 0.500
CONSISTENCY/INCONSISTENCY WITHIN AN INTERVIEW 0.53 7.41 4.94 3.70 1.000
Consistent responses −0.01 4.94 4.94 0.00 0.125
Inconsistent responses 0.85 3.70 0.00 3.70 0.250
Unspecific – 0.00 0.00 0.00 −
Other 0.57 7.41 6.17 3.70 0.625
Further examination of Table 2 reveals that in addition to
consistency across interviews, better recall during the first than
during the second interview, showing confidence or certainty,
and displaying spontaneity in the responses were also mentioned
significantly more often to justify truth than lie judgments.
On the other hand, inconsistencies across the two interviews,
better recall during the second than during the first interview,
doubts or lack of confidence, giving vague or unspecific details,
ignoring the answers, and showing nervousness or lack of
spontaneity were mentioned most often as a justification for
deception judgments. The responses being clear and/or concise
was mentioned marginally more often to justify truth than lie
judgments, and ambiguous, unclear, or verbose replies were
mentioned marginally more often to justify lie rather than truth
judgments (Table 2).
It is apparent from these data that the uninstructed
participants spontaneously used some valid cues. Specifically,
90% of them spontaneously used (in)consistencies across the
two interviews, and 35% of them used evasive answers (the
raters’ category “ignoring the answers” largely overlaps with our
“evasive answers” lie indicator).
Discussion
After coding consistency and/or evasive answers by themselves,
humans were able to classify the truthful and deceptive interviews
as accurately as the BLRAs conducted byMasip et al. (2016b). The
only exception were the participants in the consistency-evasive
condition, whose accuracy rates (around 88%) were slightly lower
than the BLRAs classification rates using the same combined
consistency and evasive answers cue (about 94%).
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FIGURE 1 | Mean accuracy rates across the different conditions in Experiment 1. For each line, means with different superscripts differ significantly from each other.
Underlined values correspond to lies.
The current results indicate that consistency can become
an indicator of veracity that can be used by human detectors,
provided a specific kind of interview is used that makes it difficult
for liars to employ the repeat strategy. However, evasive answers
allow for a better discrimination between truths and lies than
consistency, with accuracy rates approaching 90%.
An advantage of the current interviewing approach is that
even the uninstructed raters picked on the discriminative cues
and used them correctly, attaining fairly high accuracy rates
(about 75%).
EXPERIMENT 2
The participants in Experiment 1 were college students.
However, the current interview procedure was designed to
discriminate between truthful and deceptive alibies in forensic
contexts. In Experiment 2, we examined the effectiveness of
instructing law enforcement officers to code consistency, evasive
answers, and the combined variable, as well as to identify the
truthful and deceptive interviews on the basis of these cues.




The participants were 142 police officers (26 females and 116
males; M age = 40 years; SD = 8.16; age range: 25–55) who
were studying at the National Police School in Spain to become
police inspectors. On average, they had 15 years of job experience,
SD= 9.62.
Procedure and Materials
The data were collected at the Spanish National Police School. As
in Experiment 1, each class was assigned to a separate condition
(the officers’ allocation to a specific class is based on the first letter
of their surnames). The number of participants in each condition
is displayed in the top panel of Table 3. The participants signed
an informed consent form. The procedures and materials used
were identical to Experiment 1, except that because the number
of available officers was (comparatively) so small (N = 142) we
used only one set of transcripts—specifically Set 2, which was
the most representative of the results across all four sets. Also,
questions were added to the response sheet to record whether
each police respondent was novice or experienced, as well as the
specific length (in years) of their job experience.
Coding
The 22 respondents in the uninstructed control condition
provided 36 reasons for their truth judgments and 50 reasons
for their lie judgments. Two naïve coders were trained to
use the coding scheme developed in Experiment 1. However,
the relatively small number of participants in Experiment 2
(only 22 in the uninstructed condition compared to 81 in that
condition in Experiment 1) and the consequent lower frequency
of reasons for Experiment 2 were problematic. For instance,
some cues were rated 0 (cue absent) for all senders by one
(or even by the two) coder(s). In addition, the coders had
difficulty in differentiating between vague or unspecific answers
and ignoring the answers; therefore, we merged these two cues
and labeled the resulting cue as “lack of knowledge.” Table 4
contains the reliability (Kappa coefficients) and other statistics for
the individual cues mentioned by at least 25% of the uninstructed
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TABLE 3 | Sample size, mean accuracy rates, and standard deviations for the separate conditions in Experiment 2.
Measure Consistency Consistency-central Uninstructed Evasive-A Consistency-evasive Information
ALL OFFICERS
n 24 25 22 26 22 23
M 59.72a 71.53b 76.89b,c 85.45c,d 93.18d,e 98.91e
SD 10.33 9.72 14.30 8.06 9.50 5.21
VETERAN OFFICERS ONLY
n 12 16 16 17 17 15
M 61.11a 70.10a 73.44a,b 84.22b 91.67b,c 100.00c
SD 12.97 11.06 13.68 8.29 10.21 0.00
The conditions are sorted according to mean accuracy rates. Scheffé tests were conducted for pairwise comparisons; within each row, means with different superscripts differ significantly
from each other.
TABLE 4 | Most frequent reasons provided by the uninstructed participants in Experiment 2 to explain their truth and lie judgments.







Consistency across interviews 0.94 45.45 40.91 4.55 0.021
Inconsistency across interviews 0.85 36.36 0.00 36.36 0.008
CONFIDENCE/DOUBTS AND LACK OF CONFIDENCE
Doubts or lack of confidence 1.00 27.27 0.00 27.27 0.031
DETAILS OR KNOWLEDGE
Detailed or precise answers 0.91 31.82 31.82 0.00 0.016
Lack of knowledge 0.62 40.91 9.09 36.36 0.070
UNDEFINED CONSISTENCY/INCONSISTENCY
Undefined consistency 0.81 31.82 31.82 0.00 0.016
Undefined inconsistency 0.81 27.27 0.00 27.27 0.031




We conducted a mixed 2 (Veracity) × 6 (Condition) ANOVA,
with repeated measures on the veracity factor, on accuracy. The
veracitymain effect was not significant, F(1, 136) = 2.20, p= 0.141,
η
2
p = 0.016. A significant main effect for condition revealed that
accuracy varied across conditions, F(5, 136) = 60.00, p < 0.001,
η
2
p = 0.652. As shown in the top panel of Table 3, the findings
resembled those of Experiment 1 in that the sorting of the
conditions in terms of accuracy rates was exactly the same. The
uninstructed group performed again fairly well (its accuracy rate
did not differ significantly from either the consistency-central
or the evasive-A condition). Importantly, the consistency-evasive
condition accuracy was over 90% and did not differ significantly
from the accuracy of the information group. In other words, the
combination of consistency and evasive answers (consistency-
evasive condition) allowed for similar accuracy rates in detecting
truths and lies as having direct access to the truth (information
condition; see Table 3).
The Veracity x Condition interaction was also significant,
F(5, 136) = 7.16, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.208. As shown in Figure 2,
the pattern of results was similar to that of Experiment 1 in
that the increase in accuracy across the conditions was more
abrupt for truths than it was for lies (again, for lies there were no
significant differences among the consistency, the consistency-
central, and the evasive-A conditions). Bonferroni-adjusted
pairwise comparisons revealed that in Experiment 2, the evasive-
A participants detected truths significantly better than lies
(p= 0.005), but the difference was not significant for consistency-
evasive participants (p = 0.368). Further, accuracy for the
consistency-evasive condition did not differ from accuracy for
the information condition for either truths or lies (Figure 2).
Cues Used by the Uninstructed Raters
As shown in Table 4, the uninstructed condition officers
indicated they made truth judgments when they perceived the
answers to be consistent across the two interviews, detailed
or precise, and presenting “undefined consistency”10. Also,
officers indicated they made lie judgments when they perceived
10We coded as “undefined (in)consistency” those responses in which the raters
mentioned consistency or inconsistency without indicating whether they referred
to (in)consistencies across the two interviews, within the same interview (i.e., the
same suspect giving (in)consistent answers to different questions in the interview),
or among different interviewees [i.e., different suspects giving (in)consistent
answers when asked the same (set of) questions].
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FIGURE 2 | Mean accuracy rates across the different conditions in Experiment 2. For each line, means with different superscripts differ significantly from each other.
Underlined values correspond to lies.
inconsistencies across the two interviews, doubts or little
confidence, that the suspect had little knowledge (p= 0.070), and
“undefined inconsistency.” The findings indicate that just like the
uninstructed students, uninstructed officers used some valid cues
(consistency/inconsistency across interviews and, to some extent,
lack of knowledge–evasive answers) to make their judgments.
Experienced Officers
In general, experienced officers differ from novice officers.
For instance, relative to novice officers, experienced officers
have stronger beliefs about stereotypical deception cues, make
their deception judgments with more confidence, and are
dispositionally more predisposed toward questioning the veracity
of the messages produced by others (Masip and Garrido, 2001;
Masip et al., 2005, 2016a; Hurst and Oswald, 2012). Therefore,
the question remains whether experienced and novice officers can
benefit to the same extent from Masip et al.’s (2016b) interview
procedure and instruction.
While some of the officers who participated in the current
experiment where novice (n = 49), having spent <2 years in the
police force, most were veteran (n= 93; 10 females and 83 males,
M age = 45 years; SD = 4.36; age range = 36 to 55) and had
an average job experience of 22 years (SD = 4.20, range = 15 to
34). Unfortunately, the small number of available novice officers
prevented us from making formal comparisons between novice
and veteran officers; however, we did conduct analyses including
only the seasoned officers to see what the results looked like. The
number of experienced officers in each condition is displayed in
the lower panel of Table 3.
A 2 (Veracity) × 6 (Condition) ANOVA yielded a significant
main effect for condition, F(5, 87) = 28.34, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.620,
showing that veteran officers can benefit from our interview
format and instruction (Table 3). The Veracity x Condition
interaction was also significant, F(5, 87) = 4.89, p = 0.001,
η
2
p = 0.219, producing a pattern of results which was very
similar to those of the students and of all officers combined (see
Figure 3).
Comparing Officers and Non-officers
To examine whether officers and students benefited to the same
extent from the interview format and the different instruction
conditions, we conducted a direct comparison between the
officers and those students from Experiment 1 who had rated the
same transcript set as the officers (for these students, n= 116; 20
were in the consistency condition, 19 in the consistency-central
condition, 18 in the evasive-A condition, 19 in the consistency-
evasive condition, 19 in the uninstructed control condition, and
21 in the information condition). Specifically, we conducted a
Sample (students vs. officers) × Veracity × Condition ANOVA.
Neither the sample main effect, F(1, 246) = 2.28, p = 0.132,
η
2
p = 0.009, nor any of the interactions involving sample were
significant, all Fs ≤ 1.22, all ps ≥ 0.301. The only significant
effects were (again) the condition main effect, F(5, 246) = 102.99,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.677, and the Veracity x Condition interaction,
F(5, 246) = 9.41, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.161. In short, the beneficial
effects of our interview procedure and instruction conditions
were the same among police officers and students.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Recent trends in deception detection research focus on
designing strategic interview approaches to elicit verbal and
nonverbal differences between truth tellers and liars. Some of
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FIGURE 3 | Mean accuracy rates across the different conditions for experienced officers in Experiment 2. For each line, means with different superscripts differ
significantly from each other. Underlined values correspond to lies.
these approaches have attempted to elicit between-statement
inconsistencies, and have been successful only by changing the
interview mode (Leins et al., 2011, 2012), but not keeping
interview mode constant (Mac Giolla and Granhag, 2015;
Granhag et al., 2016). It has been suggested that while liars
make a conscious effort to repeat the same story throughout the
interviews, which enhances consistency, truth tellers simply try
to retrieve their memory for the target event every time they
are questioned. However, the fallibility of memory (e.g., Tulving,
2000; Loftus, 2003) impairs the consistency of the truth tellers’
accounts. As a result, the degree of inconsistency is similar among
truth tellers and liars (Granhag and Strömwall, 1999; Vredeveldt
et al., 2014).
Masip et al. (2016b) proposed that inconsistencies can be
elicited in liars with strategic interviewing if certain measures
are taken to prevent liars to use a “repeat strategy.” Based on the
way humanmemory works, they designed an interview approach
where measures were taken to limit the liars’ use of the “repeat
strategy.” As a result, truths and lies were classified accurately
about 70% of the time using consistency as the only predictor
in a BLRA. The authors also examined evasive answers, which
permitted 87% classification accuracy. Finally, a combination of
consistency and evasive answers resulted in classification rates
above 90%.
A weakness of Masip et al.’s (2016b) study is that
the classifications were derived from computerized statistical
analyses rather than being done by humans. In the current study,
college students (Experiment 1), and police officers (Experiment
2) read the transcripts, tallied the number of consistencies and/or
evasive answers, calculated their percentages, and made truth/lie
judgments. A no-instruction control group and an informed
group were included in the design for comparison purposes. The
findings revealed that, in line with our prediction, both students
and officers were able to attain high levels of detection accuracy.
Furthermore, the pattern of results was strikingly similar across
students, all officers, and experienced officers only. The fact that
the groups differed not only in occupation and length of job
experience, but also in terms of gender and age attests to the
robustness of the findings.
Overall Accuracy
Across all samples, the ordering of the conditions from lower
to higher overall accuracy (i.e., accuracy across truths and lies)
was consistency, consistency for central questions, uninstructed,
evasive answers, combination of consistency and evasive answers,
and informed (see Tables 1, 3). Thus, even though consistency
across both central and peripheral questions allowed for
accuracy rates around 60% (see the consistency condition
column in Tables 1, 3), all other conditions permitted better
accuracy rates. Evasive answers were indeed more useful than
consistencies (accuracy for the evasive-A and the consistency-
evasive conditions was always significantly higher than accuracy
for the consistency and the consistency-central conditions; see
Tables 1, 3), and the combination of consistency and evasive
answers resulted in accuracy rates slightly (non-significantly)
higher than just evasive answers and, in Experiment 2, not
significantly different from the almost-perfect accuracy rates of
the informed group11. Overall accuracy rates for the consistency-
central and the evasive-A conditions were similar to the
classification rates of the BLRAs conducted by Masip et al.
11Note, however, that in Experiment 2 the participants rated only a subset of 12
transcripts. Therefore, the Experiment 2 findings can be less representative of the
actual state of affairs than those of Experiment 1.
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(2016b), while humans’ accuracy for the consistency and the
consistency-evasive conditions was somewhat lower than the
computerized classifications (but still around 90% for this latter
condition).
Accuracy for Truths and Lies
Examination of the Veracity x Condition interactions
(Figures 1–3) offersmore nuanced conclusions. First, apparently,
the comparatively modest overall accuracy for the consistency
condition was due to a poor identification rate for truths. Put
another way, participants in the consistency condition did
reasonably well (close to 70%) in identifying lies, but much worse
in identifying truths. This finding departs from Masip et al.’s
(2016b) computerized classification rates (67% for lies, and 71%
for truths), and suggests that the respondents detected many
inconsistencies not only in judging the deceptive interviews, but
also in judging the truthful ones.
Second, the accurate detection of truthful interviews was
much higher for the consistency-central compared to the
consistency condition, which indicates that those inconsistencies
in truthful interviews that limited the consistency condition
accuracy were found in the responses to peripheral rather than to
central questions. This makes sense, since honest suspects could
have forgotten many secondary details over the 1-week retention
interval between the first and the second interview. However, if
this were the case, it is unclear why the two coders inMasip et al.’s
(2016b) study did not find somany inconsistencies in the truthful
suspects’ responses to peripheral questions. Apparently, raters in
the consistency condition of the current study underestimated
the degree of consistency in the responses to the peripheral
questions, which led them to display a lie bias. The reasons why
this happened are unclear.
Third, whereas accuracy for truths increased progressively
across all conditions, accuracy for lies did not change across the
consistency, consistency-central, and uninstructed conditions.
Similar to Masip et al.’s (2016b) classification rates, consistency
for central questions (relative to consistency across both question
types) increased the correct identification of truths but not of
lies. Thus, apparently, while consistency for central questions is
a strong indicator of honesty, inconsistency for central questions
is not such a strong indicator of deception.
Fourth, accuracy for truths was very high for the evasive-
A and the consistency-evasive conditions, and accuracy for lies
increased steadily from the uninstructed condition through the
consistency-evasive condition. Fifth, as a result, the consistency-
evasive condition accuracy rate was similar for truths and
lies, and was the highest among all the groups except the
informed one. In conclusion, the combination of consistency
and evasive answers (following the coding procedure described
in the introduction) permits the highest discrimination (about
90%) of both truths and lies using Masip et al.’s (2016b) interview
procedure.
Uninstructed Control Group
Contrary to our expectations, the uninstructed control group
performed fairly well (roughly about 75%) in separating between
truths and lies. In fact, this group performed the same as well as
the consistency-central (both experiments) or even the evasive-
A group (Experiment 2). This relatively good accuracy might
be a result, at least in part, of the vast majority of uninstructed
participants spontaneously using consistency or inconsistencies
between the two interviews to make their judgments. Similarly,
more than 30% of these participants also used cues akin to evasive
answers.
In hindsight, the uninstructed group’s high accuracy rate
makes perfect sense, and we should have anticipated it.
Prior research shows that people believe that consistency
indicates truthfulness and inconsistencies indicate deception
(Strömwall et al., 2004; Global Deception Research Team,
2006; Fisher et al., 2013; Vredeveldt et al., 2014). Moreover,
when judging veracity, people spontaneously use between-
statement consistency (Granhag and Strömwall, 2001; Strömwall
and Granhag, 2005; Street and Masip, 2015). In line with
previous studies, our uninstructed raters used between-statement
consistency too. Because the truthful and deceptive interview
pairs that we used differed significantly in terms of between-
statement consistency, it was reasonable to expect that our raters
would reach remarkable accuracy rates. Thus, a strength of Masip
et al.’s (2016b) interview approach is that it elicits in liars a
cue that people already use when judging veracity; in this way,
it boosts accuracy even among uninstructed raters. However, it
should be stressed that accuracy for the uninstructed control
condition was higher than it was for the consistency condition;
therefore, cues other than consistency (like evasive answers
or others) also might have contributed to the uninstructed
condition’s high accuracy rate (as suggested by the data in
Tables 2, 4).
One might wonder why the naïve interviewers in Masip
et al.’s (2016b) experiment performed so poorly in judging the
current suspects’ veracity (54% overall accuracy; 71% for truths,
and 40% for lies) compared to the uninstructed condition in
this study. The answer is simple: None of them interviewed
the same suspect twice; therefore, they could not compare the
suspects’ replies across the two interviews. In addition, their role
as interviewers probably consumed cognitive resources that they
could not employ to scrutinize the senders’ responses; conversely,
the raters in the current study could focus all of their attentional
and cognitive resources on the veracity assessment task. Finally,
Masip et al.’s (2016b) interviewers had access to nonverbal cues,
which are less diagnostic of deception than verbal cues (e.g., Vrij,
2008; see also Hauch et al., 2016).
The Current Procedures: The Benefits of
Minimizing the Influence of “The Human
Factor”
Masip et al.’s (2016b) goal was to design an interview protocol
to elicit diagnostic cues to deception that could be easily used to
assess veracity by any instructed rater. This involved asking very
specific questions requiring short answers—this way ambiguity
would be reduced and the coding of consistency and evasive
answers would be straightforward. It also involved designing
detailed instructions to code and use the diagnostic cues such that
any average person (rather than only the highly skilled) could
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be successfully instructed and could perform well in judging
veracity. This was attained by designing structured materials
(the transcripts and response sheets) and an almost mechanical
procedure based on comparing very short and specific answers,
tallying consistencies and evasive responses, and performing
very simple mathematical operations. There was little room
for interpretation; hence, subjectivity could hardly bias the
judgments. Such an objective, structured procedure would be
highly valuable in applied settings.
Indeed, all of this limited the influence of the “human
factor” in the current experiments, but this was intentional.
Even so, the current study goes beyond Masip et al.’s (2016b).
Unlike computers, humans can (and do) commit errors, and
their misguided beliefs, expectancies and stereotypes can taint
their judgments. We designed materials and instructions to
prevent raters from being influenced by these factors, to
efficiently code and judge the veracity of all interviews, and
to see whether their accuracy rates were comparable to the
computerized classification rates of Masip et al. (2016b). We
tested the procedures with large numbers of average raters,
including police officers—a population who could benefit from
the current interviewing approach—and examined the most
experienced officers separately to see whether their stronger
skepticism and beliefs about deception cues (e.g., Masip and
Garrido, 2001; Masip et al., 2005, 2016a; Hurst and Oswald, 2012)
limited the effectiveness of the instruction. Overall, accuracy rates
were high across all samples, and generally comparable to the
BLRAs classification rates. These findings speak in favor of our
procedures.
The procedures even permitted high accuracy rates among
uninstructed raters. We believe that using very specific questions
contributed to their success, as did the way we presented the
transcripts to them, with each suspect’s response to each question
during the second interview next to his/her response to the
same question during the first interview (see Appendix 1 in
Supplementary Material). This may have helped uninstructed
raters to spontaneously compare the responses and hence to be
able to correctly use consistency12. However, it was not the case
that, because of their specific nature, these questions produced
extremely telltale responses, as evidenced by the interviewers in
Masip et al. (2016b) attaining only a 54% accuracy rate.
Limitations
The current study has some limitations. First, each participant
read 12 interview pairs, six truthful and six deceptive ones.
Whereas, deceptive responses can vary greatly across suspects,
presumably the truthful responses of different suspects were
rather similar. Thus, by examining the consistency among
different suspects, the raters could get some hints as to which
suspects were truthful (those giving similar answers to each
other) and which were deceptive (those giving different answers).
This could have enhanced accuracy. Therefore, we examined the
raters’ use of this strategy, as well as its impact on accuracy.
12We are grateful to Dr. Joanna Ulatowska (Maria Grzegorzewska University,
Warsaw, Poland) for this observation.
Consistency/inconsistency among interviewees was amongst
the cue categories that we coded for the uninstructed group.
Only 12 (15%) of the 81 uninstructed participants in Experiment
1 reported having used this cue (see Table 2). Accuracy rates
excluding these 12 participants (78.02% for truths, 71.50% for
lies, and 74.76% overall) were very similar to those reported
in Table 1 and Figure 1 for the full sample. As for Experiment
2, only one out of the 22 participants in the uninstructed
condition reported having used this cue. Concerning the other
conditions, the participants followed our instructions carefully,
counting the number of consistencies and/or evasive answers,
as reflected in the cells of the transcript and response sheets
that they thoroughly filled in. Examination of these sheets shows
that the raters’ judgments were indeed based on the instruction
cues. Finally, the current accuracy rates are not any higher than
Masip et al.’s (2016b) BLRAs classification rates based solely on
consistency across the two interviews and/or on evasive answers.
In short, the consistency/inconsistency among interviewees was
not responsible for the high accuracy rates.
Second, critics might argue that the positive findings of the
current experiments merely reflect that Masip et al. (2016b)
produced interviews that were very easy to be sorted into truths
and lies. Indeed, the average accuracy rate across conditions
(excluding the information condition) was above 75%, and the
uninstructed control group performed at approximately that
level. This critique is misguided. First, the interviewers, who
also judged the veracity of these interviews, reached an accuracy
rate of only 54% (Masip et al., 2016b), which is the same
as the meta-analytical mean accuracy rate of humans judging
deception from verbal and nonverbal cues (Bond and DePaulo,
2006). Also, interviewers were strongly truth biased, which is
also consistent with meta-analytical findings (Bond and DePaulo,
2006). These results speak against the notion that the materials
we used contained numerous telltale deception cues which were
easy to spot. Second, the four experimental groups were asked to
count specific cues that Masip et al. (2016b) had found to differ
significantly between truthful and deceptive interviews, and that
had permitted fairly high BLRAs classification rates. Raters were
also given very precise instructions on how to use these cues to
make their judgments. The high accuracy rates were thus not an
anomaly, but the expected result. Not surprisingly, the higher (a)
the effect size [calculated fromMasip et al.’s (2016b) data] for the
difference between lies and truths for each specific cue used by
raters, and (b) the BLRAs classification rates based on these cues,
the higher the accuracy rates were in the current study13. Third,
concerning the uninstructed participants, as argued above the
data show they spontaneously used the two diagnostic cues. They
were able to do so because, unlike the interviewers, they could
carefully compare the verbal responses from both interviews.
Thus, in a sense the interviews were indeed easy to classify as
truthful or deceptive, but not because they contained lots of
straightforward deception cues, but because liars and truth tellers
13Cohen’s ds were 1.19 for consistency, 1.41 for consistency for central questions,
2.11 for evasive answers, and 2.59 for the combined consistency and evasive
answers variable. The BLRAs classification rates were 69, 73, 87, and 94%,
respectively.
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differed in terms of inconsistencies and evasive answers, which
was the result of using a specific kind of interview designed
to elicit precisely these deception cues to facilitate credibility
assessment.
Another limitation of the current study is that because
it was a proof-of-concept study to examine whether humans
could reproduce the optimal outcomes of Masip et al.’s (2016b)
BLRAs, the raters made their decisions using the cutoff points
employed by these analyses. Had the raters been free to use
cutoff points of their choice, their accuracy rates could have
been different. A problem inherent to using this approach (or
similar ones) in applied settings is that practitioners should
first be informed about the cutoff score they should use.
However, the optimal cutoff score might vary across different
situations. The impact of structural features (e.g., the number
of questions asked, how difficult they are, etc.) on cutoff scores
can be examined in controlled laboratory experiments; however,
empirically determining optimal cutoff points for specific types of
real-life cases looks hardly realistic in view of (a) the large number
of variables that might have an influence, and (b) the difficulty of
having direct access to the ground truth in real cases (knowledge
of the truth would be necessary to establish valid cutoff points).
Note that the cutoff problem affects most strategic interview
approaches to detect deception, yet it has hardly (if at all) been
discussed. However, the current findings for the uninstructed
control group suggest there is a way out, at least for the present
approach. Participants in the uninstructed condition received no
instruction at all about any cutoff score to be used to make their
judgments, yet their overall accuracy rate was around 75%. These
findings are encouraging. Still, the question remains whether our
uninstructed raters would have performed that well in a specific
real life situation. Future research should explore this issue.
Implications and Future Research
The current interview approach has a number of advantages, such
as its brevity and the high accuracy that raters (even those who
received no instruction) can reach. It could potentially be helpful
in cases where the police can collect independent information
about the alibi. For instance, a suspect might claim she was
attending a public event on her own at the time of the crime.
The police could interview a number of known attendees to
collect central and peripheral information about the event to
create a collection of specific questions. The suspect could then be
interviewed twice and her responses transcribed for assessment.
However, some considerations are in order. First, only
questions about details that almost all witnesses noticed and
recall should be included in the interview. Evasive answers
such as “I don’t know” cannot work as a deception cue if
truth tellers really do not know. Second, suspects with low IQ,
highly suggestible, or with memory deficits might be at a high
risk of giving evasive or inconsistent answers even if they are
truthful; special care is warranted in those cases. Third, the
current results suggest that if the proposed interview approach
is used and the pairs of interviews are transcribed as we did,
even uninstructed raters can do rather well (about 75% accuracy
rate). Interestingly enough, uninstructed raters were given no
specific cutoff points on any variable to make their decisions.
Their high accuracy rates thus suggest a way to go around the
cutoff point problem in applied settings, as discussed above.
Certainly, it is still possible for the accuracy of the uninstructed
group to vary from one situation to another—this is an issue
to be explored by future research—but the current findings are
encouraging. They also suggest an interesting novel orientation
for active interview approaches to detect deception: These
approaches should attempt to elicit those specific deception cues
that deception judges already use spontaneously. Inconsistency is
one such cue, but there are more (see Hartwig and Bond, 2011).
Fourth, a central feature of the current approach is that a
second, unexpected interview needs to be conducted. However,
in real cases suspects may arguably expect to be interviewed
repeatedly—though it is unclear what the proportion of real
suspects who have this expectation is, or what the police can
do to diminish this expectation. Anticipation of the second
interview might limit the use of inconsistency as a deception
cue; however, note that in the current study evasive answers
were more diagnostic of deception than inconsistencies, and
there is no need to conduct two interviews to elicit evasive
answers in liars. In fact, in the study by Masip et al. (2016b)
evasive answers discriminated between liars and truth tellers
both during the first and during the second interview. Thus, a
useful approach could be running just one interview to elicit
evasive answers. It is, however, unclear whether uninstructed
raters would perform well on the basis of evasive answers
alone. Uninstructed raters in the current study spontaneously
used inconsistencies much more often than evasive answers to
make their judgments. Also, whether the questions focused on
central or peripheral details had little effect on most of the
variables measured byMasip et al. (2016b); therefore, a simplified
version of the current interview approach could dismiss this
distinction.
Finally, it should be noted that the purpose of this
interview approach is to detect deception rather than to
collect abundant information from suspects. In this regard,
it is similar to polygraph testing. However, the current
approach is not incompatible with information gathering
approaches, which could be used afterwards. Also, in contexts
where there are multiple suspects, it could be used as
a screening procedure before starting a real investigation
focused on one or just a few suspects (i.e., those displaying
many inconsistencies and/or evasive answers) to search for
hard evidence, or before conducting time-consuming in-depth
investigative interviews with that/those suspect(s)14. In this
case, the optimal cutoff score problem would be ameliorated,
as the proposed interview approach would be used only as
a device to determine whether a suspect should be released
or more and stronger evidence of his or her guilt should be
sought.
Notwithstanding these arguments, we believe that using the
current approach at this point would still be premature. First,
it is apparent from the preceding paragraphs that there are
still many questions awaiting an empirical response. Second, we
14We are grateful to Antonio Domínguez (Behavior & Law Foundation, Madrid,
Spain) for this suggestion.
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believe that the current research makes more of a conceptual
contribution (e.g., it provides evidence that between-statement
inconsistencies can reveal deception, it suggests that evasive
answers can have potential as a deception cue, it brings in
the suggestion that strategic interview approaches to detect
deception should elicit cues that deception judges already
use spontaneously, it suggests there might be ways to go
around the optimal cutoff point problem in applied settings,
it shows the importance of minimizing the influence of “the
human factor” in judging veracity, etc.), than of a practical
contribution. Note that in the study by Masip et al. (2016b)
correct responses discriminated better between truths and lies
than did (in)consistencies and/or evasive answers. Similarly, in
this experiment the informed participants performed close to
perception (although in Experiment 2 the consistency-evasive
group performed just at the same level). Third, as pointed
out by Masip et al. (2016b), extremely high accuracy rates
need to be approached with caution; replication is necessary
before deriving strong advice for practitioners. Yet, recent
deception detection research has yielded fairly high accuracy
rates. Rather than an anomaly, these increased rates are the
result of a change in orientation in lie detection research
(Levine, 2015; see also Masip, 2017). Fourth, attempts to
replicate and extend the current findings should ideally use
more ecologically valid paradigms. Finally, once it is clear that
between-statement inconsistencies can reveal deception, research
could explore alternative procedures to elicit inconsistencies
in liars in ways that can be useful in applied settings.
Further research on the potential of evasive answers also seems
warranted.
To conclude, we believe that the present research provides
some helpful suggestions as researchers continue on the quest to
develop new interview approaches to detect deception. We hope
our findings and considerations will foster new research.
ETHICS STATEMENT
We conducted the current study in accordance with relevant
international (American Psychological Association) and
national (Código Deontológico del Psicólogo) ethics
guidelines. The participants gave written informed consent,
participated voluntarily, and were free to withdraw at any
time.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
JM conceived the research, prepared the materials, analyzed
the data, and drafted the manuscript. JM, CM, NS, and CH
collected the data. CM also entered the data and transcribed
the uninstructed condition participants’ responses to the open
questions. CM and NS checked the transcript sheets and the
response sheets for errors. NS also coded the open responses of
Experiment 1, and instructed and supervised the Experiment 2
coders. CH made the necessary arrangements to collect the data
at the Police School. IB-G and II contributed to the theoretical
rationale for the study and the research design. JM, IB-G, CH,
and II interpreted the results. All authors critically revised and
eventually approved the manuscript.
FUNDING
This research was financially supported by the Junta de Castilla y
León, Consejería de Educación, Programa de Apoyo a Proyectos
de Investigación (Ref.: SA086U14).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was formally endorsed by the National Police
School of Spain, the Behavior and Law Foundation, and the
Promoción y Divulgación Científica, S. L. company. The views
expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the supporters.
We are grateful to Ana M. Ullán and Amaia Yurrebaso for
granting us access to the student participants, to Francisco José
García (director of the National Police School) and police Chief
Inspector Francisco P. Herrero for granting us access to the police
participants, to Borja Martí, Rocío Gentil, and Víctor J. Díez for
coding, and to Silvestre Cabezas for his critical reading of the
instructions.
Thanks are also due to the two reviewers. Their constructive
comments and suggestions helped improve this manuscript.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL




Agarwal, P. K., Roediger, H. L., McDaniel, M. A., and McDermott, K. B.
(2013). How to Use Retrieval Practice to Improve Learning. Saint Louis, MO:
Washington University in St. Louis.
Blandón-Gitlin, I., López, R. M., Masip, J., and Fenn, E. (2017).
Cognición, emoción y mentira: implicaciones para detectar el
engaño [Cognition, emotion, and lying: implications to detect
deception]. Ann. Rev. Legal Psychol. 27, 95–106. doi: 10.1016/j.apj.2017.
02.004
Bond, C. F. Jr., and DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. Rev. 10, 214–234. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2
Bradley, M. M., Greenwald, M. K., Petry, M. C., and Lang, P. J. (1992).
Remembering pictures–pleasure and arousal in memory. J. Exp. Psychol. 18,
379–390. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.18.2.379
Burgoon, J. K. (2015). When is deceptive message production more effortful
than truth-telling? A baker’s dozen of moderators. Front. Psychol. 6:1965.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01965
Chandler, P., and Sweller, J. (1996). Cognitive load while learning
to use a computer program. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 10, 151–170.
doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199604)10:2<151::AID-ACP380>3.0.CO;2-U
Craik, F. I., Govoni, R., Naveh-Benjamin, M., and Anderson, N. D. (1996). The
effects of divided attention on encoding and retrieval processes in human
memory. J. Exp. Psychol. 125, 159–180. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.125.2.159
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 15 January 2018 | Volume 8 | Article 2207
Masip et al. Learning to Detect Deception
Craik, F. I. M., and Tulving, E. (1975). Depth of processing and the
retention of words in episodic memory. J. Exp. Psychol. 104, 268–294.
doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.104.3.268
Dark, V. J., and Loftus, G. R. (1976). The role of rehearsal in long-
term memory performance. J. Verbal Learn. Verbal Behav. 15, 479–490.
doi: 10.1016/S0022-5371(76)90043-8
Debey, E., Verschuere, B., and Crombez, G. (2012). Lying and executive control: an
experimental investigation using ego depletion and goal neglect. Acta Psychol.
140, 133–141. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.03.004
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton,
K., and Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychol. Bull. 129, 74–118.
doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74
Ebbesen, E. B., and Rienick, C. B. (1998). Retention interval and eyewitness
memory for events and personal identifying attributes. J. Appl. Psychol. 83,
745–762. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.83.5.745
Farah, M. J., Hutchinson, J. B., Phelps, E. A., andWagner, A. D. (2014). Functional
MRI-based lie detection: scientific and societal challenges. Nat. Rev. Neurosci.
15, 123–131. doi: 10.1038/nrn3665
Fisher, R. P., Vrij, A., and Leins, D. A. (2013). “Does testimonial inconsistency
indicate memory inaccuracy and deception? Beliefs, empirical research, and
theory,” in Applied Issues in Investigative Interviewing, Eyewitness Memory, and
Credibility Assessment, eds B. S. Cooper, D. Griese, and M. Ternes (New York,
NY: Springer), 173–189.
Gamer, M. (2014). Mind reading using neuroimaging. Is this
the future of deception detection? Eur. Psychol. 19, 172–183.
doi: 10.1027/1016-9040/a000193
Global Deception Research Team (2006). A world of lies. J. Cross Cult. Psychol. 37,
60–74. doi: 10.1177/0022022105282295
Granhag, P.-A., Mac Giolla, E. M., Sooniste, T., Strömwall, L., and Liu-Jonsson, M.
(2016). Discriminating between statements of true and false intent: the impact
of repeated interviews and strategic questioning. J. Appl. Secur. Res. 11, 1–17.
doi: 10.1080/19361610.2016.1104230
Granhag, P.-A., and Strömwall, L. A. (1999). Repeated interrogations-
Stretching the deception detection paradigm. Expert Evid. 7, 163–174.
doi: 10.1023/A:1008993326434
Granhag, P.-A., and Strömwall, L. A. (2001). Deception detection: interrogators’
and observers’ decoding of consecutive statements. J. Psychol. 135, 603–620.
doi: 10.1080/00223980109603723
Granhag, P.-A., and Strömwall, L. (2002). Repeated interrogations: verbal and non-
verbal cues to deception.Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 16, 243–257. doi: 10.1002/acp.784
Granhag, P.-A., Strömwall, L. A., and Jonsson, A. C. (2003). Partners in crime:
how liars in collusion betray themselves. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 33, 848–868.
doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2003.tb01928.x
Hartwig, M., and Bond, C. F. Jr. (2011). Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens
model meta-analysis of human lie judgments. Psychol. Bull. 137, 643–659.
doi: 10.1037/a0023589
Harvey, A. C., Vrij, A., Hope, L., Leal, S., and Mann, S. (2017a). A stability
bias effect among deceivers. Law Hum. Behav. doi: 10.1037/lhb0000258. [Epub
ahead of print].
Harvey, A. C., Vrij, A., Leal, S., Hope, L., and Mann, S. (2017b). Deception
and decay: verbal lie detection as a function of delay and encoding
quality. J. Appl. Res. Mem. Cogn. 6, 306–318. doi: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.
04.002
Hauch, V., Blandón-Gitlin, I., Masip, J., and Sporer, S. L. (2015). Are computers
effective lie detectors? A meta-analysis of linguistic cues to deception. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. Rev. 19, 307–342. doi: 10.1177/1088868314556539
Hauch, V., Sporer, S. L., Michael, S. W., and Meissner, C. A. (2016). Does training
improve detection of deception? A meta-analysis. Commun. Res. 43, 283–343.
doi: 10.1177/0093650214534974
Hurst, M., and Oswald, M. (2012). Mechanisms underlying response
bias in deception detection. Psychol. Crime Law 18, 759–778.
doi: 10.1080/1068316X.2010.550615
Leins, D., Fisher, R. P., Vrij, A., Leal, S., and Mann, S. (2011). Using sketch
drawing to induce inconsistency in liars. Legal Criminol. Psychol. 16, 253–265.
doi: 10.1348/135532510X501775
Leins, D., Fisher, R., and Vrij, A. (2012). Drawing on liars’ lack of cognitive
flexibility: detecting deception through varying report modes. Appl. Cogn.
Psychol. 26, 601–607. doi: 10.1002/acp.2837
Levine, T. R. (2015). New and improved accuracy findings in deception detection
research. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 6, 1–5. doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.03.003
Lisofsky, N., Kazzer, P., Heekeren, H. R., and Prehn, K. (2014).
Investigating socio-cognitive processes in deception: a quantitative
meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. Neuropsychologia 61, 113–122.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.06.001
Loftus, E. F. (2003). Make-believe memories. Am. Psychol. 58, 867–873.
doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.58.11.867
Mac Giolla, E., and Granhag, P.-A. (2015). Detecting false intent amongst small
cells of suspects: single versus repeated interviews. J. Invest. Psychol. 12,
142–157. doi: 10.1002/jip.1419
Masip, J. (2017). Deception detection: State of the art and future prospects.
Psicothema 29, 149–159. doi: 10.7334/psicothema2017.34
Masip, J., Alonso, H., Garrido, E., and Antón, C. (2005). Generalized
Communicative Suspicion (GCS) among police officers: accounting
for the investigator bias effect. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 35, 1046–1066.
doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2005.tb02159.x
Masip, J., Alonso, H., Herrero, C., and Garrido, E. (2016a). Experienced and novice
officers’ generalized communication suspicion and veracity judgments. Law
Hum. Behav. 40, 169–181. doi: 10.1037/lhb0000169
Masip, J., Blandón-Gitlin, I., Martínez, C., Herrero, C., and Ibabe, I. (2016b).
Strategic interviewing to detect deception: cues to deception across repeated
interviews. Front. Psychol. 7:1702. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01702
Masip, J., and Garrido, E. (2001). “Experienced and novice officers’ beliefs about
indicators of deception,” in Paper presented at the 11th European Conference of
Psychology and Law (Lisbon).
Pezdek, K., Sperry, K., and Owens, S. M. (2007). Interviewing witnesses: the effect
of forced confabulation on event memory. Law Hum. Behav. 31, 463–478.
doi: 10.1007/s10979-006-9081-5
Roos af Hjelmsäter, E., Öhman, L., Granhag, P.-A., and Vrij, A. (2014).
’Mapping’ deception in adolescents: eliciting cues to deceit through an
unanticipated spatial drawing task. Legal Criminol. Psychol. 19, 179–188.
doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8333.2012.02068.x
Sakrisvold, M. L., Granhag, P.-A., and Mac Giolla, E. (2017). Partners under
pressure: examining the consistency of true and false alibi statements. Behav.
Sci. Law 35, 75–90. doi: 10.1002/bsl.2275
Sporer, S. L. (2016). Deception and cognitive load: expanding our horizon with
a working memory model. Front. Psychol. 7:420. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.
00420
Sporer, S. L., and Schwandt, B. (2006). Paraverbal indicators of deception: a meta-
analytic synthesis. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 20, 421–446. doi: 10.1002/acp.1190
Sporer, S. L., and Schwandt, B. (2007). Moderators of nonverbal indicators of
deception: a meta-analytic synthesis. Psychol. Public Policy Law 13, 1–34.
doi: 10.1037/1076-8971.13.1.1
Street, C. N. H., and Masip, J. (2015). The source of the truth bias: heuristic
processing? Scand. J. Psychol. 53, 254–263. doi: 10.1111/sjop.12204
Strömwall, L. A., and Granhag, P.-A. (2005). Children’s repeated lies and truths:
effects on adults’ judgments and reality monitoring scores. Psychiatry Psychol.
Law 12, 345–356. doi: 10.1375/pplt.12.2.345
Strömwall, L., Granhag, P.-A., and Hartwig, M. (2004). “Practitioners’ beliefs about
deception,” in Deception Detection in Forensic Contexts, eds P.-A. Granhag and
L. A. Strömwall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 229–250.
Tulving, E. (2000). “Concepts of memory,” in The Oxford Handbook of Memory,
eds E. Tulving and F. I. M. Craik (New York, NY: Oxford University Press),
33–43.
Vredeveldt, A., van Koppen, P. J., and Granhag, P.-A. (2014). “The inconsistent
suspect: A systematic review of different types of consistency in truth tellers
and liars,” in Investigative Interviewing, ed R. Bull (New York, NY: Springer),
183–207.
Vrij, A. (2008). Nonverbal dominance versus verbal accuracy in lie detection.
A plea to change police practice. Crim. Justice Behav. 35, 1323–1336.
doi: 10.1177/0093854808321530
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., and Blank, H. (2017). A cognitive approach to lie detection: a
meta-analysis. Legal Criminol. Psychol. 22, 1–21. doi: 10.1111/lcrp.12088
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., Blank, H., Leal, S., and Mann, S. (2016). “A cognitive approach
to elicit verbal and nonverbal cues to deceit,” in Cheating, Corruption, and
Concealment, eds J.-W. Van Prooijen and P. A. M. Van Lange (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 284–310.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 16 January 2018 | Volume 8 | Article 2207
Masip et al. Learning to Detect Deception
Vrij, A., and Granhag, P.-A. (2012). Eliciting cues to deception and truth:
what matters are the question asked. J. Appl. Res. Mem. Cogn. 1, 110–117.
doi: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2012.02.004
Vrij, A., Granhag, P.-A., and Porter, S. (2010). Pitfalls and
opportunities in nonverbal and verbal lie detection. Psychol.
Sci. Public Interest 11, 89–121. doi: 10.1177/15291006103
90861
Walczyk, J. J., Harris, L. L., Duck, T. K., and Mulay, F. (2014). A
social-cognitive framework for understanding serious lies: activation-
decision-construction-action theory. New Ideas Psychol. 34, 22–36.
doi: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2014.03.001
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2018 Masip, Martínez, Blandón-Gitlin, Sánchez, Herrero and Ibabe.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums
is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic
practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 17 January 2018 | Volume 8 | Article 2207
  Learning to Detect Deception 
 
1 
1 Appendix 1: Transcript Page for the Consistency Condition Corresponding to Suspect 7 in Set 3-D 
 
Notes. The number on the top left side (“3”) is the set number, while the letter “D” after “Participant” stands for “direct” order; these codes 
were for the researchers only. Questions 1 and 2 were “Did you steal a wallet in Seminar Room 126? (All suspects replied “No”), and “Then 
you have done some tasks in an office room with a researcher?” (All suspects replied “Yes”); therefore, only 16 questions (questions 3 
through 18) were relevant. For confidentiality reasons, no actual participant’s answers are shown on this table.  
 
  Learning to Detect Deception 
 
2 
2 Appendix 2: Analyses with the Corrected Data 
2.1 Experiment 1 
2.1.1 Veracity x Condition ANOVA on accuracy  
• Veracity main effect: F (1, 469) = 4.73, p = .030, ηp
2
 = .010. 
• Condition main effect: F (5, 469) = 128.67, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .578. 
• Veracity x Condition interaction: F (5, 469) = 8.85, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .086. 
• No other effect was significant. 
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 (2.27) 81.74 (15.29) 
Note. Scheffé tests were conducted for pairwise comparisons. Within each row, means with different superscripts differ significantly from each other. For those columns 
with an asterisk in the column heading the difference in accuracy between judging truths and lies was significant.   
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2.2 Experiment 2 
2.2.1 All Officers: Veracity x Condition ANOVA on Accuracy 
• Veracity main effect: F (1, 136) = 1.66, p = .199, ηp
2 = .012 (not significant). 
• Condition main effect: F (5, 136) = 48.76, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .642. 
• Veracity x Condition interaction: F (5, 136) = 7.04, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .206. 
• No other effect was significant. 
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Information Across Conditions 


























 (5.42) 80.94 (16.44) 
Note. Scheffé tests were conducted for pairwise comparisons. Within each row, means with different superscripts differ significantly from each other. For those columns 
with an asterisk in the column heading the difference in accuracy between judging truths and lies was significant.   
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2.2.2 Experienced Officers Only: Veracity x Condition ANOVA on Accuracy 
• Condition main effect: F (5, 87) = 26.76, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .606. 
• Veracity x Condition interaction: F (5, 87) = 4.40, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .202 . 
• No other effect was significant. 
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Information Across Conditions 
Lies 70.83a,b (14.43) 72.50a,b (17.32) 62.50a (25.46) 80.20b,c (13.46) 90.98c,d (10.59) 100.00d (0.00) 79.78 (19.80) 













 (2.15) 81.20 (16.42) 
Note. Scheffé tests were conducted for pairwise comparisons. Within each row, means with different superscripts differ significantly from each other. For those columns 
with an asterisk in the column heading the difference in accuracy between judging truths and lies was significant.  
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2.2.3 Officers and Students Who Had Rated the Same Set as Officers: Sample x Veracity x 
Condition ANOVA on Accuracy 
• Sample main effect: F (1, 246) = 1.36, p = .244, ηp
2 = .006 (not significant). 
• Condition main effect: F (5, 246) = 104.50, p < .001, ηp
2 = .680. 
• Veracity x Condition interaction: F (5, 246) = 10.32, p < .001, ηp
2 = .173.  
• No other effect was significant. 
